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Abstract 
This paper addresses the place of exiles and refugees in the Greek poleis (city-states), with a 
focus on the later Classical and Hellenistic periods (c. 400–100 BC). It examines the different 
forms of protection and aid granted by Greek poleis and their citizens to people displaced 
through war and civil strife. Its main focus is the range of arguments and ideals advanced by 
ancient Greeks as grounds for granting these forms of protection and aid to exiles and 
refugees. Displaced Greeks and their hosts could, for example, present aid to displaced 
groups as guided or inspired by justice, law, freedom and shared Greek identity. Alternatively, 
in a move which became increasingly prominent in formal political contexts in the period 
considered here, they could present help to the displaced principally as a matter of respecting 
unconditional ethical ties binding together all humans, or all ‘citizens of the world’. This 
paper argues that the diverse range of relevant Greek practices and values both reflected and 
helped to shape complex and shifting ancient Greek ideas about the city, citizenship, 
democracy, justice, freedom, virtue and gender. Throughout its argument, the paper draws 
connections and contrasts between ancient Greek and modern liberal practices and ideology, 
and their underpinnings in broader ethical and political ideals. Modern liberal practices and 
values concerning aid to refugees draw on, and combine, the approaches and traditions 
evident in the ancient Greek world, as well as diverging from them in revealing ways. 
 
1. Introduction 
Exiles and refugees were very prominent in the world of the ancient Greek city-states.2 This 
paper takes as its focus the values, ideologies and debates through which the ancient Greeks 
of the cities addressed the issue of refuge, hospitality and aid to displaced outsiders. It pays 
particular attention to three ideals which came to prominence in ancient Greek debates about 
when and how to grant refuge and asylum to displaced people, which continue now to shape 
Western debates about refugees.  
 
The first ideal discussed here is what may be called ‘humanitarianism’. There is no doubt that 
the philosophy and practice of humanitarianism have taken on in the modern world many 
features and nuances which are not remotely applicable to ancient Greece. Nonetheless, the 
ancient Greeks did have a clear notion of the basic, unifying ideal essential to different forms 
of humanitarianism: the ideal of equal, unconditional compassionate concern for all fellow 
humans as humans, which should be put into practice, wherever possible, to alleviate severe 
human suffering or deprivation. Because this ideal calls on all humans to take a consistent 
approach to all fellow humans, it can be described as ‘universalist’, as well as ‘humanitarian’. 
 
In Greek thinking, this ethical ideal was often closely connected with the virtue of ‘humanity’ 
or ‘love of humanity’ (philanthropia in Greek). Ancient Greeks certainly did sometimes focus 
on kinds of philanthropia exercised within particular, bounded communities and relationships. 
The philosopher Aristotle, however, extrapolating from the ethical culture of his time, 
explicitly identified philanthropia as the virtue through which humans act on the solidarity 
which exists between them all automatically as members of the same species.3 According to 
the conception captured by Aristotle, philanthropia should rightly be directed equally4 at all 
human creatures, by virtue of their humanity, in keeping with the basic humanitarian ideal 
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defined here. The question of who qualifies as a ‘human’, and thus for humanitarian aid, 
could be contentious in the ancient world, as in the modern: consider Aristotle’s famous view 
of slaves as tools, similar to animals.5 Nonetheless, as will be evident in sections 5 and 7 
below, ancient Greeks often also adopted more expansive views of ‘humanity’, explicitly 
including women and slaves among the legitimate beneficiaries of philanthropia. Moreover, 
as will be seen later in the next section, the humanitarian ideal of equal compassionate 
concern for all fellow humans, which must be exercised when confronted with humans in 
severe need, was embodied in some ancient Greek institutions and practices, especially some 
religious rituals. 
 
The second ideal investigated in this paper is what can be called, for convenience, the ideal of 
the ‘state of refuge’ or ‘city of refuge’.6 This is a more political ideal: the good city should be 
particularly concerned with protecting and supporting particular displaced people, as a way of 
defending and promoting a specific set of interconnected values and interests. As well as 
being more political, this ideal has the most substantial overlap with more prudential and 
realist approaches to refuge: approaches which treat it as expedient for the well-run city to 
grant refuge to certain displaced people, in order to reward past services and create incentives 
for new ones. 
 
The third ideal discussed here is that of cosmopolitanism. Again, it is important to bear in 
mind that cosmopolitan philosophy and practices have changed radically since ancient Greek 
thinkers discussed them. Nonetheless, ancient and modern cosmopolitanism, like ancient and 
modern humanitarianism, can be seen to share a basic, unifying ideal. In the case of 
cosmopolitanism, that unifying ideal is the ideal of a type of citizenship and civic equality 
which cuts across borders of status and territory, such that hosts have political duties to fellow 
cosmopolitans in difficulty. These political duties go beyond requirements of humane 
sympathy and alleviation of severe suffering, to include the more substantial kinds of 
solidarity and interaction characteristic of fellow citizens.  
 
I argue that these different ideals interacted in a very complex way in ancient Greek debates 
about exiles and refugees: they were often mainly rivals and opposites, rather than 
complementary ideals. Indeed, ancient Greek responses to the displaced reveal much about 
the complexities and internal tensions, much debated by modern historians, of ancient Greek 
city-states’ political ideologies, especially concerning citizenship, political belonging and 
outsiders.7  
 
The focus here on ideals, ideology and discourse might be thought not to do justice to more 
practical questions about aid to exiles and refugees in ancient Greece, which are certainly 
worthy of further study.8 Needless to say, Greek cities did not always live up to the ideals of 
refugee aid they themselves promoted. As will be seen a few times in the discussion, those 
ideals themselves were probably often exploited to conceal, or dress up, the self-interest of 
individuals and whole cities. Nonetheless, those ideals are worth studying in depth, not 
merely as revealing intellectual or theoretical experiments, but also as important influences 
and constraints on ancient Greeks’ behaviour towards refugees: in most societies, those 
professing particular ideals must at least take them into account in their decision-making, 
even if only to ensure their conduct at least appears to conform with them.9 
 
Indeed, in this particular case-study, values and ideals concerning asylum and aid certainly 
helped to define the basic parameters of citizens’ practical interaction with displaced outsiders. 
This was due to a phenomenon familiar from other parts of this volume.10  Namely, relevant 
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ideals and debates themselves helped to shape the different Greek categories and stereotypes 
of the exile and refugee, partly reflected in complex and rich Greek terminology:11 for 
example, contrasting Greek views of forced migrants as more self-confident political exiles or 
fugitives (phygades, pheugontes) or as more obviously helpless ‘wanderers’ (planomenoi), 
‘suppliants’ (hiketai or hiketeuontes), ‘displaced people’ (ekpiptontes, ekpesontes) or 
‘expellees’ (ekballomenoi, ekblethentes).12 Cities did not merely encounter certain types of 
forced migrant, but actively helped to shape the status, identities and behaviour of the 
displaced Greeks who reached their territory, who in turn helped to determine the 
development of local civic life. 
 
The diversity of Greek vocabulary to describe displaced people reflected the complex range 
of processes which could lead to displacement in the ancient Greek world. Individuals could 
be sentenced to exile or outlawry as a punishment. It is usually hard to trace the subsequent 
lifestyles of individuals exiled in this way, including their treatment by hosts. There is much 
more plentiful evidence for the lifestyles, and reception in new cities, of Greeks expelled in 
groups, usually as a result of war or civil war. This paper concentrates on Greek ideals 
concerning the treatment of such groups, who often had much in common with many modern 
forced migrants: they were forced to flee from their homes en masse, in order to seek safety 
from civil or interstate violence. Even within this group there was, however, much diversity. 
In particular, as will be seen, civil wars or staseis tended to lead to the displacement of 
particular political factions, who could style themselves as political exiles, pursuing a return 
home at the expense of their domestic rivals (see below, section 3, on Akarnanian exiles at 
Athens). In the case of interstate war, by contrast, the displaced were often fleeing the 
destruction or occupation of their whole city (see below, section 4, on displaced Plataeans at 
Athens or displaced Samians in the wider Greek world). Nonetheless, even if they had been 
displaced through quite different processes, all displaced groups seeking hospitality and aid 
posed similar questions for host cities: on what grounds should these obvious outsiders from 
the citizen-body, arriving in need and distress, be granted aid from civic resources?    
 
2. Refugees and supplication in Aeschylus 
Before broadening out to analyse the broader ancient Greek context, and its complex modern 
legacy, it is worth examining in detail a specific example from Classical Athenian tragic 
drama. Tragic drama is one of the richest surviving sources of evidence for Athenian civic 
ideology and collective ethical reflection.13 My specific example concerns a tragic play 
written in the later 460s BC by Aeschylus, the first of the three major Athenian tragic 
playwrights, which addressed directly the issue of refugee aid. This was Aeschylus’ Suppliant 
Women, which drew on the Greek myths about the Danaids, the fifty daughters of Danaus, 
who fled from Egypt in order to avoid being forced to marry their cousins, the sons of King 
Aegyptus. Aeschylus, like other Athenian tragedians, wrote plays for performance at public 
festivals of the Athenian democracy. That deeply political context immediately makes it clear 
why Athenian drama was so closely linked with civic debates and political ideology. 
 
The Danaus and Danaids of Aeschylus’ play seek the help of Pelasgus, king of Argos, one of 
the major cities of Greek myth and history. They supplicate Pelasgus: they perform the 
common Greek ritual called supplication, a formal way of entreating the help of the more 
powerful or secure.14 In the play, Danaus reports to his fellow refugees the success of this 
appeal. Pelasgus has referred their case to the Argives in assembly. The Argives have voted to 
allow the Danaids to live in their territory, free, protected from seizure, and with asylia: 
‘inviolability’ or ‘safety’ against physical threats. No one, Argive or foreign, is to be allowed 
to capture them; any Argive who fails to protect them will lose his civic rights. Importantly, 
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Danaus gives a hint of Pelasgus’ successful argument to the assembly: the Argives should 
never provoke the anger of the god Zeus, the protector of suppliants.15  
 
Aeschylus thus represents the Argives treating respect for the god Zeus, in his capacity as 
protector of suppliants, as a very weighty reason to grant protection to these forced migrants, 
perhaps even sufficient in itself, irrespective of these migrants’ particular credentials. The 
Argives have accepted what they perceive as Zeus’s expectations, which have a humanitarian 
bent, in the sense outlined above: those with the capacity to help should act unquestioningly 
on requests for aid by any fellow human beings in serious need of protection from 
exploitation or persecution.  
 
Aeschylus seems to be portraying here something which has significant similarities with, 
though it is far from identical to, the modern liberal ideology and practice of asylum.16 The 
quasi-democratic state in this play, Argos, grants refuge, with formal legal guarantees, to 
individuals who approach it with a formal request for protection against persecution by the 
leaders of their home community. In doing so, the state recognises universal duties towards 
any fellow humans in need of protection, enforced by Zeus. These duties are ‘universal’ with 
respect to their potential beneficiaries: the particular origins and character of the suppliants 
are irrelevant; all humans have an equal claim to this kind of compassionate aid when in 
severe need. These duties are also ‘universal’ in their binding force: any individual or group 
is obliged to observe them, since no-one can escape Zeus’ authority. Not to observe them 
would be to cast oneself out from civilised society, and from Zeus’ good-will. The language 
of ‘asylum’, asylia, even features in the ancient Greek context, as in the modern. The 
relationship between the hosts and the refugees might appear paternalistic, but it is at least 
regulated through formal legal provisions and a strict religious code. 
 
There are, of course, significant differences between Aeschylus’ picture, paralleled in some 
other Athenian tragic drama,17 and contemporary, post-1945 liberal ideology and law 
concerning asylum. The democratic voting on asylum in Aeschylus’ play is alien to modern 
liberal approaches, which treat asylum as a universal legal principle, not something open to 
democratic deliberation. Nonetheless, Aeschylus’ Argives do not deliberate and vote as if 
engaged in a routine Greek political debate. Rather, they vote to recognise and uphold a 
universal principle, even though it is one which has religious rather than legal grounding; to 
make any other decision would be to break a major taboo.18 Like those responsible in modern 
states for scrutinising asylum-seekers’ claims, they simply judge whether the particular 
suppliants in the particular case before them are covered by the universal requirement. In any 
case, as discussed in section 4 below, it is doubtful whether many such votes on asylum took 
place in historical reality, rather than in myth and theatre, where they serve special dramatic 
and ideological functions. 
 
Another important contrast is that modern liberal practice and ideology concerning asylum 
are not themselves straightforwardly unconditional,19 like Aeschylus’ Argives’ approach. The 
specific focus of the most widespread form of modern liberal asylum law is aid to those who 
suffer persecution on the grounds of certain protected characteristics (race, caste, nationality, 
religion, political options or participation in a social group). This approach, which has roots in 
Cold War rivalries, has been criticised for making eligibility for asylum too narrow and 
conditional, but also praised as a sensible way of preserving a distinct type of concern and 
protection for victims of persecution, exiled from membership of their political 
communities.20 Nonetheless, modern liberal law and ideals are unconditional in ways relevant 
to the comparison with the tragic play: relevant modern legal standards do guarantee 
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unconditional asylum for all who can demonstrate that they have suffered persecution on 
relevant grounds, regardless of the specific content of their relevant religious or political 
opinions and social relationships. 
 
This point can be well expressed in terms of the modern distinction between ‘impartial’ and 
‘partial’ approaches to refugee questions. As Gibney puts it, modern liberal arguments for aid 
to refugees tend to emphasise ‘impartiality’: a liberal democratic state has a duty to give equal, 
impartial consideration to the needs of all humans, or all who reach its territory, regardless of 
their particular origins, status, identity, beliefs, or view of the good life and good society. 
Such arguments from ‘impartiality’ are directed against defenders of ‘partiality’, who argue 
that states should concentrate on the needs of their own citizens, and the promotion of the 
state’s own distinctive culture.21 
 
A further complication in the comparison between the Aeschylean approach and modern 
liberal asylum is that impartiality does not coincide precisely with humanity or 
humanitarianism. Nonetheless, an important driver of the modern liberal ideal of impartiality 
towards refugees is the aspiration to give sophisticated legal and normative form to ideals of 
equal compassionate concern for the needs of all human beings. This humanitarian impulse 
finds expression, not only in liberal ideals of asylum, but also in liberal arguments for broader 
types of aid, including ‘subsidiary’ and ‘humanitarian’ protection, for a wider range of 
refugees, including those displaced for other reasons than persecution, especially war. These 
broader types of aid have achieved new levels of prominence since the end of the Cold War.22 
 
In the light of these considerations, there is an important shared element of impartiality and 
humanitarianism which binds together the ethical approach to asylum of ideal modern liberals 
and Aeschylus’ Argives. Nevertheless, this particular case-study is not a reliable guide to the 
wider ancient Greek picture. Even if important aspects of the modern liberal practice and 
ideology of asylum were prefigured in the Athenian theatre, other ancient Greek evidence 
tends to point in other directions. Aeschylus himself, and his Athenian audience, may 
themselves have been quite sceptical about the Argives’ decision to grant unconditional 
asylum to the Danaids: the subsequent two plays of Aeschylus’ trilogy about the Danaids are 
very likely to have portrayed their presence in Argos as highly disruptive.23 In any case, other 
Classical Greeks who addressed the issue of refuge tended to favour ideals much further 
removed from modern liberal ones, for interesting reasons which I explore in the following 
sections. 
 
3. Practical differences affecting ancient Greek and modern liberal approaches to 
refugees  
Some of the reasons why many ancient Greek practices and ideologies were distant from 
modern liberal ones were pragmatic. In mythical contexts such as that of the Danaids, it was 
easy to imagine an all-powerful persecutor, such as King Aegyptus, whose power stretched 
far beyond his own territorial borders. In reality, however, the world of the ancient Greek 
city-states was very different. Famous cities like Athens, Sparta and Argos represent only a 
handful of the total number of city-states. In the Classical period (c. 480–323 BC), there were 
at any one time around 1000 city-states around the Aegean and the wider Mediterranean.24 In 
the following centuries, after the conquests of Alexander the Great, even more city-states 
were founded and flourished, in the Near and Middle East as well as the older Greek World. 
Occasionally one state became overwhelmingly dominant, like Sparta after its victory in the 
famous fifth-century Peloponnesian War. In such a context it became worthy of note that 
other cities gave safe residence to opponents of the dominant power.25 In general, however, 
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power was so fragmented and widely distributed, with many different city-states in 
competition, that it was relatively straightforward for refugees to find a new place of 
residence, away from their persecutors. 
 
Another practical reason why the mere granting of residence rights was not usually something 
to boast about in ancient Greece was the nature of Greek cities’ approaches to foreign 
residents more generally. In most city-states, there was a special category of resident 
foreigners who had moved into the city from elsewhere, often called metics, as at Athens; this 
status category often coexisted with a range of other status categories for residents who were 
free, rather than slaves, but not full citizens.26 Metics were long-term foreign residents, often 
voluntary rather than forced migrants from another city or region, who had formally 
registered as residents of their new city. This status carried very substantial financial and 
military burdens, with relatively few corresponding privileges.27 As a result, the presence of 
foreign residents was usually much less of a controversial issue than in modern liberal 
democracies: in the absence of any strong ethical or political pressure to integrate resident 
foreigners within the exclusive, privileged group of citizens, cities did not need to worry 
about profiting to the full from foreign residents’ labour and contributions to civic life. This 
arrangement meant that it was usually not the grant of mere residence rights to refugees, but 
more substantial grants of aid and privileges, which ancient Greek cities considered it worth 
advertising as a special service.28 
 
This tendency is evident from one of the most revealing surviving sources of evidence for 
ancient Greek cities’ approaches to forced migrants: documents recording and publicising the 
grant of aid and privileges to them, usually awarded to groups.29 Such documents are 
preserved because Greek cities inscribed them durably on stone for public consumption, in 
keeping with their more general practice of inscribing on stone important civic laws and 
decisions. Several such inscriptions are preserved from the Classical Athenian democracy.30 
One records aid granted to some exiles from the region of Akarnania in the western part of 
the central Greek mainland (dating to 338/7 BC).31 This inscribed decree first confirms the 
hereditary honorific Athenian citizenship of the Akarnanian exiles’ leaders, Phormio and 
Karphinas, and then grants extensive specific privileges to the other displaced Akarnanians. 
According to the text which scholars have reconstructed, these other privileges were granted 
as follows: 
 
Praise also the other Akarnanians who have come to help with Phormio and Karphinas, 
and let them have, until they return home from exile, the legal entitlement to own whatever 
houses they wish, provided that they are living at Athens, exempt from the tax on resident 
foreigners (the metoikion); and let them bring and incur legal suits like Athenians, and pay 
special one-off taxes (eisphorai), if any arise, together with the Athenians. And the council, 
which is always deliberating, and the strategoi [leading military officials of the Athenian 
state], who are always in office, should take care of them, so that they do not suffer any 
injustice. 
 
These Akarnanian beneficiaries were allies of the Athenians, who had been fighting on the 
Athenians’ side in the wars of the mid-fourth-century, but now found themselves expelled 
from their home cities in Akarnania as a result of changes of regime. The privileges they 
gained included some which were usually limited to citizens: the unrestricted right to buy 
houses at Athens and participate fully in the Athenian courts, as well as the full support of 
Athenian officials. Significantly, their privileges probably also included, if the reconstruction 
is correct, exemption from the metoikion, the standard tax on resident foreigners. This 
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confirms that this grant was intended precisely to raise the status of these refugee friends of 
Athens above that of run-of-the-mill metics, by granting them something much greater than 
mere safe residence.32 
 
4. The Classical Athenian ‘city of refuge’: patriotism, reciprocity, justice and freedom 
In addition to these practical considerations, there were also ideological reasons why 
humanitarian, unconditional approaches to refuge were not standard in Classical Athens. In 
ancient Greece, as in modern Greece, ideals of open, unconditional hospitality to strangers, 
and humanity towards the weak and vulnerable, were pervasive. Hospitality and guest-
friendship are already very important in the Homeric poems. Also prominent there is the 
practice of supplication, already encountered above in the Aeschylus passage, which was 
certainly not restricted to forced migrants. Moreover, asylum in the technical Greek sense, 
also encountered above in the Aeschylus’ passage, was taken very seriously: certain religious 
sites, especially temples and their altars, were inviolable.33 Those who took refuge in such 
places were protected from seizure by their enemies or by civic authorities: their fate, and 
possible punishment, was now a matter for the gods, beyond the scope of politics and law.34 
Seeking asylum at an altar or temple was equally as possible within one’s one state as beyond 
it: in civil wars, for example, an individual or faction could seek refuge at an altar in an 
attempt to avoid suffering violence.35 
 
Nevertheless, although these ethical and religious ideals were pervasive in Greek culture, a 
strong case can be made that the Greek city-states found it quite difficult to integrate them 
into their political ideologies and institutions, including those concerned with refuge. As 
Price has argued on quite different grounds, the ancient Greeks tended to treat decisions about 
refuge as governed by distinctive political norms and logic.36 The nature of ancient Greek 
politics is obviously a very complex and debated issue,37 but a few broad generalisations can 
be made, which will gradually be justified better in the course of this paper. In ancient Greece, 
strict politics and political deliberation were usually the province of hard-headed calculation 
of interests, including (or especially) collective civic interests.38 There were significant 
interstate institutions, regulations and norms, which governed both diplomacy and warfare, 
but even those gave considerable weight and scope to the interests of individual city-states.39 
To add another similarly broad generalisation, ancient Greek political life was also often a 
sphere dominated by particular relationships and attachments, including relations of 
patriotism and honour.40 Furthermore, it was also normally a domain strongly shaped by 
ideals of strict justice and demanding civic virtue.41 
 
These varied political considerations were often difficult to square with ethical and religious 
requirements of humane concern for all fellow humans.42 We can even see the Athenian 
theatre, where Athenian tragic plays were performed, as an unusual place of collective 
questioning and reflection. In the theatre, exceptionally, conflicts between politics and ethics, 
or between justice and humanity, could be explored, and aspirations for a more humane 
politics expressed. Modern thinkers have often seen Sophocles’ Antigone, for example, as an 
exploration of the conflict between religious and ethical norms of human and humane 
sympathy and the harsher demands of political and legal justice.43  
 
Tendencies towards universalism and humanitarianism clashed, on the one hand, with the 
inequalities and self-interest of Greek cities. The Greek city-states relied on quite rigid and 
complex status distinctions: distinctions between slaves and free; and between citizens and 
free non-citizens, such as metics.44 Moreover, membership of most status categories was 
deeply conditional: an individual could lose citizen status, and sometimes even free status, if 
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he or she transgressed against certain civic laws and norms.45 Conditionality could also be 
positive: certain citizens and foreigners received particular honour and privileges, in 
recognition of outstanding civic virtue and contributions. For example, in their decree for the 
Akarnanian exiles (quoted above), the Athenians advertised their special aid to particular 
exiles who had ended up in exile partly as a result of their loyalty to Athens. In a separate 
case, the fourth-century orator Demosthenes, in a speech advising the Athenians not to alter 
the privileges of benefactors of the city, explicitly exhorted the Athenians not to forget their 
reciprocal obligations to aid those who had been forced into exile through their loyalty to 
Athens.46 As Demosthenes recognised,47 the aim of such aid to loyal exiles was partly to 
provide an incentive to other Athenian allies, or potential allies, to exert themselves on 
Athens’ behalf. Similarly, aid to certain exiles could serve a polis’ self-interest by raising the 
prospect of good treatment in return, perhaps in the event that the hosts should find 
themselves exiled in future.48 Aid which was presented as unconditional and humanitarian 
could not have had the same incentivising effects; it might even undermine the whole system 
of differentiated, conditional status.  
 
On the other hand, universalism and humanitarianism were also quite hard to reconcile with 
other aspects of Greek city-states’ culture which were themselves clearly ethical, especially 
many Greek cities’ strong concern with substantial standards of justice, equality, virtue and 
freedom. Stress on unconditional, humane benevolence to refugees would not have obviously 
advanced those ideals. It might even have curtailed them, by appearing to devalue the ideal of 
special commitment to one’s own particular community, and to downgrade the particular, 
intense types of egalitarian solidarity which become possible within a close-knit polis. By 
contrast, linking aid to refugees to the defence and promotion of certain values enabled the 
Athenians to use the practices and rhetoric of a city of refuge to advance their specific, 
demanding political and cultural ideals.49 
 
This can be illustrated through speeches by two of the major orators of the fourth-century 
Athenian democracy, Lysias and Isocrates. Both of these orators celebrate Athens’ aid to 
refugees in an idealistic spirit, in speeches which extol Athens’ virtues as a political and 
ethical model.50 Needless to say, these orators gave a distinctly one-sided picture of Athens’ 
role and motivations. In practice, the Athenians were sometimes motivated to aid refugees, or 
to refuse aid, as a result of calculations of immediate self-interest, rather than any 
considerations of ethics or reciprocity. Christ, for example, sees a strong opportunistic 
dimension in the Athenians’ decision in the early 340s BC to send aid to the city of Olynthos 
in northern Greece, under pressure from Philip II of Macedon, despite the mixed history of 
Athenian-Olynthian relations. One consequence of this convenient co-operation was that the 
Athenians subsequently gave aid to some of the refugees from Olynthos displaced when 
Philip II succeeded in destroying the city. They did so surely partly in order to encourage 
other cities – including those not already close friends with Athens – to continue to resist 
Philip.51 Moreover, the Athenians had done much to create, as well as to help, refugees while 
running their fifth-century BC empire.52 Even in the fourth century BC itself, the Athenians 
notoriously expelled the whole citizen population of the island polis of Samos, in order to 
establish an Athenian settlement there. On their return after their long collective displacement 
(365–322 BC), the Samians passed decrees in praise of a wide range of individuals and cities 
around the Aegean and wider Mediterranean who had chosen, surely in a partly anti-Athenian 
spirit, to aid them during their exile.53 This confirms that many other cities than Athens 
engaged in the Classical period in giving hospitality and aid to the displaced, establishing or 
reinforcing particular, partial relationships with them, based on mutual recognition of shared 
interests and values. 
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Despite their distortions of a complex reality, the speeches of Lysias and Isocrates give some 
of the best insights into the more idealistic features of Classical Athenian ideology concerning 
refugee aid. The key point for the argument here is that, when these two orators present 
Athens as a city of refuge, their emphasis falls squarely on justice: even in these most 
idealistic expressions of Athenian hospitality, the ideal of unconditional, humane aid to 
suppliants is absent or muted. The comparison between the ideology of these speeches and 
modern liberal approaches to refugees is, nonetheless, a complex one. Indeed, the rhetoric of 
Lysias and Isocrates hovers in interesting ways between the ideals captured by the modern 
terms ‘impartiality’ and ‘partiality’, discussed in section 2 above.54 
 
The two orators strike a clear note of eagerness to enforce standards of justice which are 
universal, and certainly transcend Athenian society and its borders. In his early fourth-century 
Funeral Speech, Lysias praises the mythical ancient Athenians’ aid to the children of 
Heracles when they came to Athens as suppliants fleeing their pursuer, King Eurystheus, who 
subsequently sought their extradition. Lysias presents this as an example of the Athenians’ 
desire to fight for the weaker ‘with justice’, rather than to hand over the victims of injustice 
(the adikoumenoi) to their powerful oppressors.55 This language is picked up by Isocrates, 
who praises Athens, in his Panegyricus of c. 380 BC, as a ‘common city’ for all, which stands 
up for those who have suffered injustice,56 almost certainly including refugees.57 Isocrates 
also applied this trope in a more specific context in his Plataicus, a later speech written 
ostensibly for delivery by some Plataean refugees of the 370s BC. These were descendants of 
more famous fifth-century Plataean refugees (see below, this section), who were again 
pleading for Athenian aid. Isocrates’ Plataeans there open by appealing to the Athenians’ 
history of helping victims of injustice, and later present themselves as suppliants, with faith in 
Athens’ long tradition of aid to suppliants.58 
 
These notes in the orators’ rhetoric sound quite close to liberal impartiality; but other aspects 
of their speeches show that they certainly did not aspire to be neutral between views of the 
good life and the good society, or impartial in their treatments of the advocates of those 
different values. Isocrates makes clear in the Panegyricus passage that Athenian aid to the 
victims of injustice is not truly universal: the Athenians support Greeks who suffer injustice.
59
  
 
Moreover, the Athenian ideal of aid to refugee victims of injustice was usually also restrictive 
and partial even when it came to Greeks. This is clearest in Isocrates’ late work, the 
Panathenaicus (340s BC). In that work, Isocrates contrasts Athens and Sparta. Whereas the 
Spartans drove out from their homes the people of the cities of Messene and Plataea, Athens 
provided these victims of injustice with refuge: they settled the Messenians in the city of 
Naupaktos; and they gave the famlous fifth-century Plataean refugees refuge, and citizenship, 
in Athens itself.60 Isocrates makes quite clear in this discussion that he is working with a 
distinctly partial, and very substantial and rich, vision of Greek history, politics and culture, 
as a basis for his conception of justice and benevolence. He celebrates the Plataeans, for 
example, as indispensable contributors to the Greek war effort against the Persians in the 
fifth-century Persian Wars, which Isocrates presents as a successful struggle for Greek 
freedom. 
 
For Isocrates, therefore, the value of the Athenians’ integration of the expelled Plataeans as 
their own fellow citizens did not lie principally in its impartial justice, but rather in its 
recognition, promotion and assimilation of the particular virtues and contributions of a 
specific community, the Plataeans, who were both close friends and kin of the Athenians and 
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broader ‘benefactors of Greece’. Conversely, the Spartans’ conduct was particularly 
reprehensible because they mistreated those to whom they were bound by specific relations of 
kinship.61 Isocrates had also laid stress on the Plataeans’ special virtues and kinship and 
loyalty with Athens, as grounds for reciprocal Athenian aid, in his Plataicus:62 the appeals 
there to Athenian generosity to victims of injustice and to suppliants are quickly followed by 
reminders of the Plataeans’ particular concrete services to Athens, which deserve an 
appropriate, just return.63  
 
In general, the Classical Athenians tended especially to favour refugees and exiles who were 
transparent partisans of the Athenian democracy, like the Akarnanians or Plataeans, and had 
been displaced as a result.64 Indeed, the Athenians were particularly well-disposed, in a 
clearly ‘partial’, conditional way, to those exiles who, like the Akarnanians and Plataeans, 
had a longstanding record of loyalty to Athens, often already institutionalised through formal 
diplomatic links and grants of special status. The Akarnanians’ leaders, for example, were 
already honorary citizens of Athens (compare above). Other exiles might benefit from pre-
existing grants of proxeny (a grant of the formal status of diplomatic representative of the 
granting city in one’s home city).65  
 
As a result of the ‘partial’ dimension of the Athenians’ approach, there was no question of 
Athenian aid to the victims of injustice extending to Spartans, or to other anti-democrats, who 
might have suffered unjust treatment. The Athenian city of refuge was not seeking to be an 
impartial melting-pot: as the evidence of inscriptions and speeches shows, the Classical 
Athenians approached and represented their granting of aid to particular refugees as a way of 
maintaining particular useful, reciprocal diplomatic relationships, but also as part of a radical 
project to change the world, in an egalitarian and democratic direction, in furtherance of 
specific historical struggles for freedom and equality. This is true even though, in practice, 
that project was closely bound up with Athenian interests, and even Athenian imperialism, in 
ways which continue to be debated vigorously.66 
 
5. Gender, citizenship and autonomy in Athenian debates about refuge  
There is another ideological dimension to the question of why the quite humanitarian 
approach of Aeschylus’ Argives, considered in section 2, is not characteristic of mainstream 
Classical Greek political rhetoric about refugee aid, even its more idealistic forms. This 
dimension concerns questions of gender and age, patronage and independence. It is worth 
noting that Aeschylus’ play concerns suppliant women. Similarly, it is not coincidental that 
one of the other main Greek myths about aid to refugees concerns the children of Heracles, 
quite young in age, often represented as accompanied by an elderly escort, Iolaos.67 It was 
precisely those who were not adult male citizens who could be straightforwardly presented as 
deserving of humane compassion and support.68 In Classical Athenian ideology, adult males 
were, by contrast, expected to be capable of much greater independence and self-defence.69 It 
would have been demeaning, or feminising, for adult males to accept any form of charity, or 
any other relationship which placed them in a position of clear dependence on hosts. 
 
Instead of posing as humane champions of helpless refugees, the Athenians strove to equip 
adult male refugees with the means to continue to act, even in exile, as self-sufficient, 
autonomous political agents. For example, in their grant of privileges to the Akarnanians 
(quoted above), the Athenians explicitly granted privileges to the Akarnanians only ‘until 
they return home’. The Athenians thus presupposed that the Akarnanians would be 
sufficiently organised and courageous to achieve a successful return, defeating their 
opponents at home. The Athenians also often collaborated with displaced groups in enabling 
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them to create at least an appearance of autonomy as ‘cities-in-exile’ or ‘citizens-in-exile’, 
with their own improvised institutions, diplomatic links and collective activities.70 
 
While these Athenian-supported ‘cities-in-exile’ (or ‘quasi-cities-in-exile’) were often based 
in Athens, they could also coalesce elsewhere, in contexts which would have made it easier 
for their members to claim relative independence and self-sufficiency. For example, the exiles 
from Messenia settled in the city of Naupaktos by the Athenians, mentioned by Isocrates (see 
previous section), organised themselves, and acted, as a ‘city-in-exile’. Indeed, they probably 
did much, alongside their fellow exiles from the region, to develop and sharpen a Messenian 
political identity, including its foundational idea that the Messenians were a coherent, 
traditional ethnic group dedicated to liberation from Spartan oppression, to be achieved 
through the foundation of a free Messenian polis in the Peloponnese.71 The power relations in 
play between Athens and different exile groups were, in reality, complex: as noted above, aid 
to favourable refugees was itself an arm of Athenian imperialism. Nonetheless, it is 
significant that both the Athenians and the beneficiaries themselves tried to conceal, or even 
palliate, that inequality. 
 
Temporary, improvised ‘cities-in-exile’ were created, in Athens and elsewhere,72 not only by 
exiled political factions, but also by those who were unquestionably refugees: for example, 
the Plataean refugee community in Athens held a monthly meeting in the Athenian cheese-
market,73 partly comparable to the monthly principal assembly of a settled polis. Indeed, 
ancient Greece was rich in self-confident, resilient and politicised refugees, of the type whose 
importance in world history Gatrell has recently emphasised.74 Indeed, exile and refugee 
communities, with their own institutions and agency, interacted dynamically with a much 
broader range of migrant communities in Greek cities: recent studies have brought into 
increasing focus the complexity and vitality of Greek cities’ voluntary social, economic and 
religious associations, which often cut across the citizen-foreigner boundary to include 
foreign residents, whether they were forced or voluntary migrants.75 There was thus rich 
social and collective life in Greek cities beyond interactions within the main citizen-body; but 
that broader social life was itself strongly shaped by the structures and ideals of citizenship 
and civic participation, ripe for improvised co-optation and adaptation.76     
 
6. Cosmopolitanism in Classical Athenian exile politics 
To summarise my argument so far, Classical Greek, or Classical Athenian, discourse about 
refugee aid was marked by unequal competition between a secondary ideal of 
humanitarianism, underpinned by religious standards, and the more prominent ideal of the 
just city of refuge, which predominated in practical political rhetoric. These two ideals were 
also in tension with a third ideal: cosmopolitanism. This was a more marginal and disruptive 
ideal. Indeed, the original advocates of a cosmopolitan approach to all refugees which was 
highly inclusive and universalist, but still resolutely political or civic, were precisely those 
exiles and refugees in Athens who fell through the cracks of official Athenian aid.77 These 
early cosmopolitan exiles were members of the Cynic and Stoic philosophical schools in 
Athens, especially the Cynic exiles Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes. Diogenes was 
unlike most of the displaced Greeks considered here, because he had not been forced into 
exile as part of a large group: according to the richly symbolic story of social subversion 
which was later used to explain his exile, he had been driven into exile from Sinope on the 
Black Sea, together with his father, because either he or his father had tampered with his 
home city’s coinage, for which they were responsible.78 Crates did, however, have much in 
common with refugees discussed so far: his home city of Thebes was destroyed by Alexander 
the Great in 335 BC.79      
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These Cynic philosophers took aim squarely at the prevailing particularism of the Greek civic 
world. The Cynics argued that they were themselves exiles only by convention. In fact, they 
could never be exiled from their true ‘city’, the natural cosmopolis of all virtuous men who 
‘live according to nature’.80 This stance gave rise to a wide range of ethical anecdotes about 
the early Cynics and their approach to exile, which were recorded by later writers. Crates, for 
example, was later said to have rejected Alexander the Great’s suggestion that Thebes could 
be rebuilt: that would only lay it open to attack by another Alexander. Crates reputedly 
preferred to treat poverty and lack of fame as his ‘country’, as a ‘fellow citizen’ of 
Diogenes.81 
 
Cosmopolitanism thus originated as a very radical attack on the very notion of particular 
states and borders, in favour of the ideal of an all-encompassing world polis. In rejecting 
particular civic affiliations, the early Cynic philosophers were implicitly rejecting the 
tendency of their hosts, the Athenians, to create and support separate expatriate groups, each 
devoted to retaining strong links with their home polis. They were, however, also going 
further: implicit in their arguments was a rejection of the very notion that there ever truly is a 
relationship between a refugee and a host, rather than between two ‘citizens of the world’. 
Although Greek cosmopolitanism started off as a mainly negative philosophy, it was also 
given more constructive form in subsequent centuries; this is the concern of the next section. 
 
7. Hellenistic developments  
The three approaches to refugee aid converged in interesting ways in the Hellenistic period (c. 
323–31 BC). That is the age, after the reign of Alexander the Great, of the great kingdoms of 
the Ptolemies, the Seleucids, and others. Greek cities continued to exist and prosper within 
these kingdoms, and in the gaps between them. The character of these cities, and their 
political ideologies, is a prominent, much debated issue in contemporary ancient history.82 
This section examines the interaction of different civic ideals, new and old, in approaches to 
displaced people in Hellenistic cities. 
 
Alexander’s wide-ranging conquests, throughout the Near and Middle East, vastly increased 
the extent and variety of the Greek world, as well as making its overarching political 
structures more hierarchical. This created a social and political environment propitious for an 
increase in interest in mankind as an ethical community which cut across boundaries of status 
and citizenship. Although it quickly became prominent in Hellenistic philosophy,83 this more 
universalistic approach did not immediately percolate into the civic discourse of the Greek 
cities: Greek civic institutions and discourse of the third century BC were often remarkably 
consistent with those of the fourth century.84 Nonetheless, more universalistic approaches did 
gain greater prominence in civic discourse in the second and first centuries BC, although 
traditional particularist ideals remained strong at the same time. 
 
This development was most vividly reflected in the increasing attention given in the official 
rhetoric of Greek cities in the second and first centuries BC to the virtue of philanthropia, 
literally ‘love of humanity’, first mentioned in the introduction to this paper. Philanthropia 
even came often to be expected of good citizens, as a key part of their civic virtue and 
lifestyle, including their interactions with fellow citizens. That development was certainly due 
to a range of factors, including specific social and political changes of the mid- and later 
Hellenistic world: for example, Roman intervention and the consolidation of inequalities 
within poleis, which increased the need for paternalistic charity. Nonetheless, the influence of 
more universalistic ethics must have been an important part of the process, alongside other 
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causes.85 As noted in the introduction to this paper, philanthropia was not straightforwardly a 
humanitarian virtue as well as a humane one: it did not automatically demand impartial 
compassion towards all humans equally. Nonetheless, through its etymology and its usage, 
explored further below, the word did point in that direction: if one is a ‘lover of humanity’, 
then one should appreciate human characteristics and needs, wherever they happen to be 
found, without discrimination.86 
 
These developments had repercussions for the Hellenistic cities’ approaches to the question 
of refugee aid, especially from the second century BC onwards. Indeed, from that point, 
humanitarian considerations came to play a prominent role even in some official civic 
rhetoric, avowedly political in nature. That is to say, the kinds of official civic document and 
practical political rhetoric studied in earlier sections of this paper began to take on new 
features: while their Classical Athenian versions had concentrated on clearly political and 
particularist grounds for aid to the displaced, mid- and later Hellenistic documents and 
speeches gave a new prominence to more humanitarian considerations, of kinds which had 
earlier been advocated more by playwrights and other intellectuals. 
 
Hellenistic references to refugee aid are found in inscribed ‘honorary decrees’ of Greek cities: 
formal decrees which cities passed in their assemblies, in order to honour benefactors and 
show gratitude. One such decree, dating to the early second century BC, records the honours 
passed by the city of Elateia in central Greece in honour of the citizens of Stymphalos in the 
Peloponnese, who had helped them when they were driven out of their own city by war:87 
 
... [showing] assiduousness in humane behaviour, appropriate to our kinship (?) 
(ἐκτενεί[αν φιλα]ν̣θ̣ρωπίας τᾶι σ̣[υγγενείαι καθ]ακοῦσαν) ... they welcomed us, each of 
them into his own home, with all humanity (?), and from public funds they provided all 
of us with bread rations for a substantial period of time and provided everything which 
was necessary. And they shared with us their sacred activities and sacrifices, 
considering us their own fellow citizens. And they divided up some of their own 
territory and distributed it to us Elateians, and gave general immunity from taxation for 
a period of ten years.... 
 
The Stymphalians had thus ensured the Elateians’ welfare by giving them access to food, land 
and religious life. In an interesting sign of the transition to a new approach in official political 
rhetoric about refugees, the Elateians praised the Stymphalians at the start, if the text has been 
reconstructed correctly, for ‘assiduousness in humane behaviour, appropriate to our kinship’: 
they cited both universal humanity and particular relations of kinship, based on the cities’ 
shared mythical history; new and old political ideals sat side-by-side. Interestingly, the decree 
emphasised the collective grant of charitable help, not only to women and children, but also 
to adult male citizens, who gratefully accepted the aid. Despite the presence of these male 
Elateians, the Stymphalians did not help the Elateians to continue to behave like an 
autonomous political group, in a further contrast with the Classical Athenian model: as the 
inscription goes on to record, the Stymphalians performed embassies on the Elateian refugees’ 
behalf. As a result, there comes into view in this text something with particularly strong 
affinities with the modern status of refugee: a dependent political status open to all, including 
adult males displaced from their normal settled citizenship.
88
 
 
Similar rhetoric features in another honorary decree passed by a Greek city, much later in the 
second century BC, this time for an individual. This is an honorary decree passed by the city 
of Colophon in western Asia Minor for a particularly wealthy and prominent citizen, 
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Polemaios. Dating to around the 120s BC, when the Roman conquest of the Greek world was 
well advanced, it praised Polemaios as follows:89 
 
He has also treated in a civic and humane way many of those who have taken refuge 
with the people, as a result of chance difficulties, and sought help. He has 
enthusiastically made financial contributions and joined in taking in the refugees, both 
on his own account and in response to the appeals for help made by the people.... He has 
also made friendly loans to not few of the foreigners in need who took refuge with the 
people, not overlooking anyone who has been struck down by a crisis, but ensuring that 
he is equal towards all and through everything always acts as a benefactor, not only in 
public towards those inhabiting the city, but also in private....   
 
Polemaios was thus praised for having given financial aid, both donations and loans, to 
refugees who fled to his home city, presumably fleeing war and unrest. This is perhaps the 
point in the Greek sources at which displaced people are conceptualised and represented in a 
way most in keeping with a prominent modern stereotype of refugees: refugees as a 
heterogeneous, dependent, even helpless group, in need of both protection and positive aid. 
Polemaios’ aid to these people was very forcefully presented, in this formal political 
document, as evidence of his philanthropia. 
 
It was not only refugees from war who were deemed worthy of humane, charitable treatment 
in some post-Classical Greek cities: even political exiles could be treated in this way. In an 
honorary inscription from the first century AD, the community of the Lycians, an ethnic 
group based in southern Asia Minor, praised a wealthy female benefactor, Junia Theodora, 
living in Corinth in the Peloponnese, for her generosity towards members of an exiled Lycian 
political faction. This was presented as a particular reflection of her tendency towards general 
sympathy and benevolence towards all.90 Issues of gender are again relevant: gentle, humane 
virtues, newly respected as political virtues, could be comfortably attributed to women 
benefactors, as well as men. The connection with first-century AD Corinth is also interesting 
for discerning broader trends: this was the Corinth of Paul and his letters. This is symbolic of 
the way in which language of humane philanthropy in the Hellenistic Greek cities fed directly, 
alongside other sources, into early Christianity, and its universalistic ethics of charity.91 
 
This might well appear a very traditional picture of the development of Hellenistic Greek 
ethics and politics towards the ethical approaches of the Roman Empire92 and early 
Christianity, which was already a cliché in the writings of Hegel and Nietzsche. According to 
this picture, Classical Greek concern with the small-scale city, and with strict justice, equality 
and democracy, gave way to a Hellenistic focus on the whole world community of Greeks or 
humans, and duties of charitable benevolence binding them together. According to a common 
version of this view, the new emphasis on humane concern, including humane concern for 
exiles and refugees, is a sign of depoliticisation, which robbed the weak, including refugees, 
of political agency. Indeed, the argument continues, this new emphasis is a sign of the 
triumph of a Greek elite which could increasingly dispense with democratic scrutiny or 
considerations of justice and equality, and instead make paternalistic use of the language and 
gestures of philanthropy to pre-empt dissent and reinforce the status quo.93 
 
It is true that I am partly subscribing to this view, but the situation was more complex. As 
noted above, more traditional civic ideals remained vibrant alongside newer universalistic 
ones, and sometimes the two were combined. For example, in the relevant section of the 
honorary decree of Colophon for Polemaios, quoted above, humanitarian ethics did not drive 
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out questions of citizenship, justice and equality. On the contrary, the citizens of Colophon 
there attempted to reconcile within a single ideology politics and ethics, justice and 
humanitarianism. Polemaios’ behaviour towards refugees was explicitly said to be both 
humane and civic. Moreover, it was claimed that his humanity was consistent with the whole 
ethos of his polis.
94
 Paradoxically, according to this decree, it is only within a specific polis 
that an individual can learn to be truly humane or humanitarian, and act accordingly. 
 
It was also explicitly claimed that Polemaios’ behaviour promoted a universal type of equality. 
He wished to behave in a way ‘equal towards all’, or at least towards all residents of his city, 
whether they were citizens or not: true civic concern extends in a cosmopolitan direction.95 
Moreover, the generosity to the refugees was not solely a result of Polemaios’ arbitrary 
charity: he responded to a formal public appeal by the city for donations to help the refugees. 
This resembles the way in which the Stymphalians’ humane concern (see above) was put into 
practice through formal civic decisions and embassies. Moreover, both Polemaios’ and the 
Stymphalians’ generosity was also subject to public scrutiny through the honouring process 
itself, leading to the decrees quoted here, through which civic assemblies scrutinised their 
behaviour. Robust civic institutions, including some with redistributive functions, could thus 
be reconciled with an emphasis on humane concern for the weak. 
 
This type of ideological reconciliation was not universally popular in the Hellenistic cities, 
but it did have wider resonance. It was sometimes applied in official documents to the issue 
of outsiders more generally. In an honorary decree of the city of Priene in western Asia Minor, 
also dating to the late Hellenistic period (first century BC), Aulus Aurelius Zosimos, himself 
a foreigner who had been naturalised as a citizen, was praised for providing the humane 
benefaction (philanthropia) of a special breakfast ‘to all on equal terms’ on his first day in 
office. He included even slaves and foreigners, disregarding their inferior legal status. Indeed, 
Zosimos was explicitly praised for recognising, if only for one day, that the inferior status of 
slaves and foreigners is only a social construct, which conceals a deeper human equality.96 
 
In sum, there are select traces in Hellenistic civic rhetoric of phenomena partly familiar from 
modern, post-1945 liberal approaches to refugee aid, though obviously also still very different 
from them. The main point of contact is that these Hellenistic inscriptions attest an attempt to 
reconcile the conflicting triad of Classical Greek approaches to refugee aid, by fusing 
humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism with the language and institutions of political justice 
and law, still centred on the individual state. This attempt at synthesis can be reasonably 
compared with many modern liberals’ attempts, through the 1948 Declaration of Human 
Rights, the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, and subsequent applications and 
justifications of them, to synthesise those different values into unified new ideals of human 
equality, human rights and cosmopolitan universalism, also still enforced by individual 
states.97 
 
That overlap between Hellenistic and modern approaches raises complex ethical and political 
issues. Is it a coincidence, or is it troubling, that this kind of attempted synthesis first emerged 
in ancient Greece in the highly unequal, hierarchical world of the Hellenistic poleis, coming 
under the domination of Rome? It might be argued that this kind of ideology emerges only 
when elites are sufficiently entrenched not to fear erosion of their property or privileges – 
which makes it safe to start talking about universal equality, and to politicise humanitarianism. 
Alternatively, however, it could be argued that this was, in fact, a Hellenistic moral 
development which modern liberal internationalists can admire, as a highly attractive step 
forward from the small-city exclusivity of the earlier Greek world. 
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Even if we do opt to see this Hellenistic trend as an attractive development, we still have to 
weigh what was lost by opting for political or civic humanitarianism. To what extent did the 
new Hellenistic discourse of civic humanitarianism deprive the displaced, and other marginal 
groups, of agency and autonomy? To what extent did it make necessary, or reflect, the 
abandonment of grand projects of social, political and cultural transformation, of the kind 
associated with Classical Athens, in favour of a blander universalism, a type of egalitarianism 
more extensive in scope but diluted in content? As noted above, that apparently bland and 
benevolent universalist egalitarianism may well have helped to conceal, or palliate, new 
forms of domination of the weaker by the stronger.98 Modern critics of the liberal ideology of 
human rights, and associated practices,99 would no doubt find cautionary precedents in the 
Hellenistic shifts discussed in this section. The moral question remains whether the losses are 
offset by the value of the Hellenistic cities’ resilient efforts to adapt traditional Greek 
republicanism, solidarity and participatory politics to suit a new, expanded and more mixed 
world.      
 
8. Conclusion: broad ancient Greek trends and their modern influence 
Ancient Greek ideologies concerning asylum and refuge were marked by complexity, tension 
and disagreement. The ideological triad of humanitarianism, the city of refuge and 
cosmopolitanism were in tension in political debates of the Classical period. Some Hellenistic 
Greeks then fused together contrasting Classical ideals into a complex new ideological 
synthesis in their political arguments. That Hellenistic synthesis partly prefigures 
contemporary liberal approaches. According to this picture, the earlier, Classical Greek cities 
certainly knew of ideas of humanitarianism and universalism, but tended actively to reject or 
marginalise them in their official, political rhetoric, in favour of more particularist ideals. The 
story is, therefore, one of rival, conscious moral and political choices, rather than a crudely 
developmental story of an expanding Greek moral consciousness. 
 
This picture is relevant to modern refugee studies for many reasons. In addition to the 
comparative angle, already discussed, there is also the issue of the indirect and direct 
influence of Greek ethics and politics on modern thinking about refuge. The indirect 
influence comes through Christianity and through the varied European Classical tradition, 
which have strongly shaped modern democratic and republican political thought and language. 
One consequence is that modern liberalism, and even modern liberal internationalism, carry 
not far beneath their universalist surface some of the marks of quite different approaches 
intrinsic to Classical republican political thought: for example, traces of exclusive, 
conditional citizenship ideals, and exclusive, conditional approaches to refugees’ needs, both 
underpinned by very robust notions of particularist, patriotic civic virtue.100 Indeed, the way 
that modern liberal societies continue to give much greater attention and status to political 
refugees, rather than economic migrants and refugees, must partly reflect the enduring power 
of the Classical civic and republican tradition, with its stress on the particular value of equal, 
free political participation. That tradition gave conceptual, linguistic and cultural resources, 
whether they were conscious of the debt or not, to Cold-War liberals who sought to contrast 
Western civil liberties with Communist intolerance through their shaping of liberal asylum 
law and policy, in such a way as to give special prominence to aid towards victims of political 
persecution. 
 
Classical ideas have also impinged more directly on modern debates about refugees. The 
foundational book in the study of ancient Greek refugees, Balogh (1943), was a 
contribution to developing twentieth-century legal and political discourses about 
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refugees,101 as well as a scholarly study of the ancient Greek case. The author, Elemér 
Balogh, a Hungarian refugee scholar of law, legal history and comparative law who spent 
time teaching in Lithuania, Germany, the USA, Canada, South Africa and Sweden, was a 
committed advocate of international law and peace built on Classical principles,102 
including in relation to refugees.103 His work on ancient Greek refugees adopts a 
universalist approach, sensitive to the suffering of Balogh’s own forerunners as refugees. 
For Balogh, the most compelling ancient Greek model for the present is Alexander the 
Great’s sweeping ‘Exiles’ Decree’ of 324 BC, ordering the Greek cities to reintegrate 
almost all their exiles: this is a significant case of a power larger than any single (city-)state 
seeking to achieve general repatriation.104 
 
Another Classicist deeply involved in the evolution of modern ideas about refugee aid was 
Gilbert Murray (1866–1957),105 Professor of Greek at Glasgow and Oxford. He was very 
active in the British League of Nations Union from the 1920s onwards, participating in its 
efforts to draw attention to refugee problems. Together with Lord Cecil, he led a delegation 
in May 1935 to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, to discuss the refugee 
problem and the League of Nations.106 He also sought to draw attention to the Refugee 
Problem after the Second World War, delivering a BBC broadcast ‘Thoughts on Refugees’ 
in October 1956.107 Murray was also very influential in the campaigns to accommodate 
refugee scholars in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, as a prominent member of the 
Academic Assistance Council (founded in 1933), which became the Society for the 
Protection of Science and Learning in 1936.108 This activity was partly born of Murray’s 
longstanding liberal convictions, but, as Oswyn Murray has argued,109 it might also be seen 
as a form of ‘repentance’ for Murray’s support of condemnations of German intellectuals 
in 1914, including in a collective letter to The Times supporting the new war, signed by 
many British academics.110  
 
It is possible to compare Murray’s approaches to ancient and modern refugees. In a book of 
1913 on Euripides, addressed to a wide readership, Murray discusses Euripides’ play, The 
Children of Heracles. Murray concludes that the Athenian aid to mythical refugees in that 
play reveals Euripides’ ‘ideal of Athens’: 
 
Athens will be true to Hellas and all that Hellas stands for: for law, for the gods of 
mercy, for the belief in right rather than force. Also, as the king of Athens is careful to 
observe, for democracy and constitutional government. He is no despot ruling 
barbarians.111  
 
Murray thus summarised different ancient Greek ideals I have discussed, making them 
plain to a wide twentieth-century readership.112 He later himself applied this approach to 
the question of modern refugees. In a letter to The Times113 in 1940, calling for better 
treatment of (certain) German refugees, he adopted very much the approach he had earlier 
attributed to Euripides. He wrote: 
 
There are now two dangerous cries: one is “intern all Germans”, which is already 
taking the form “intern all foreigners”. This is the reaction of the average ignorant and 
unthinking man, who can see no difference between one German and another, or, if it 
comes to that, between one foreigner and another. Oppressor and victim, Fascist and 
anti-Fascist, they are all the same to him.... Surely our greatest asset in the eyes of the 
world is not merely that we are fighting for a righteous cause, but that we are a decent 
nation with a high standard of honour.114 
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This example illustrates my broader argument about the complexity of the Classical 
inheritance. Murray was one of the leading intellectuals of liberal internationalism in early 
and mid-twentieth century Britain, and yet his approach to refuge and asylum in public 
debate includes several Classicising elements which appear a bit out of kilter with liberal 
internationalism, at least in its post-1945 form: in the full letter, he talks about good and 
bad Germans,115 or good and bad foreigners, indeed, of ‘recognising friends and enemies’; 
he disparages ‘barbarians’ and the vagaries of the uneducated mob; and he stresses 
patriotism, the importance of being a ‘decent nation with a high standard of honour’ 
(maybe he should have said ‘a decent polis’).116 This demonstrates that Classicising civic 
republicanism and civic humanism have not always chimed closely with modern liberal 
humanism, or humanitarianism, though they are very closely linked. Classical particularism 
and civic patriotism, or even anti-universalism, were very prominent even in the twentieth-
century birth throes of modern liberal humanitarianism and United-Nations 
cosmopolitanism. Modern liberal ideals of asylum and refuge aid have a very complex and 
conflicting genealogy, including a complex and conflicting Classical dimension. 
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